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Class Action Arbitration: A Plaintiff’s Perspective* 
Sarah Clasby Engel  
Sherry Tropin** 
Early arbitration agreements arose mainly from disputes between indi-
vidual parties, where the streamlined process was an effective and less 
complex alternative to litigation in resolving disputes.  With the rise of class 
action lawsuits, businesses seeking to reduce litigation expenses and dam-
ages awards have sought to use arbitration clauses to preclude class actions 
altogether.  Courts have struggled to determine whether such class action 
waivers are valid and whether, even in the absence of such a waiver, class 
claims are subject to arbitration.  The resultant uncertainty unfortunately 
often leads to more expensive and time-consuming legal maneuvering.  
After a brief synopsis of the relevant statutory scheme, this article examines 
recent developments in class action arbitration and explores the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of arbitration to class action plaintiffs. 
I.  THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
In order to promote the use of arbitration as a more streamlined dis-
pute resolution process, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides the 
framework for enforcing arbitration clauses and recognizing domestic and 
foreign arbitral awards.1  Under the FAA, courts have the power to require 
parties to comply with a domestic or international arbitration agreement and 
to stay pending litigation.2  The resulting arbitration decisions are subject to 
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1
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).  In 1970, Chapter 2 of the Act was added to place international arbi-
tration agreements within the FAA, consistent with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, to which over 140 countries are a party.  9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2006).  Chap-
ter 3 of the FAA establishes the recognition of foreign arbitral awards and decisions where there is 
reciprocity under the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of January 
30, 1975.  9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2006). 
 
2
 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2006). 
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judicial review in only a narrow set of circumstances, including fraud or 
corruption.3  Arbitration clauses are treated as binding contracts and courts 
can invalidate them “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract,” such as unconscionability.4  The Florida Arbi-
tration Code mirrors the FAA.5   
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ACTION ARBITRATION LAW   
As arbitration has developed as an alternative to litigation, the law has 
evolved to meet the challenge of larger and more complex matters.  In Mit-
subishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court 
affirmed the strong presumption in favor of arbitration and enforced an 
agreement requiring arbitration of antitrust claims arising from an interna-
tional transaction.6  The Court found that arbitrators are well positioned to 
resolve matters requiring special expertise and that arbitration is appropriate 
in asserting the statutory claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act.7  The 
Court found that “(h)aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should 
be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights as issue.”8     
The limited judicial review under the FAA was affirmed in Howsam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.9  The Court held that only “gateway” matters of 
the validity of the arbitration agreement are subject to judicial review.10  All 
other matters, within the arbitration agreement, are for the arbitrators to 
decide.11 
The question of judicial review of class action arbitration agreements 
has arisen in both state and federal courts and was addressed in the seminal 
                                                                                                                           
 
3
 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).  The FAA provides an award is not subject to judicial review except 
in the following circumstances:  
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evi-
dent partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were 
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by 
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their pow-
ers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject mat-
ter submitted was not made. 
Id. 
 
4
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 
5
 See FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-682.22 (2009). 
 
6
 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 
7
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). 
 
8
 Mitsubishi Motor Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. 
 
9
 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 
10
 Id. at 83-86. 
 
11
 Id. at 85. 
2009] Class Action Arbitration: A Plaintiff's Perspective 147 
 
case of Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.12  The issue before the Court 
was whether arbitration can proceed as a class action when the agreement to 
arbitrate is silent on this issue.13  In Bazzle, the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina had interpreted the silence of the arbitration contract as permitting 
class actions.14  While the U.S. Supreme Court did not directly address the 
legality of the class action certification in the face of the silence in the 
agreement, a plurality of the Court found that the validity of the class was a 
matter for the arbitrator to decide and remanded the issue accordingly.15  
Since there had been no decision by the arbitrator, the Court did not reach 
the decision of whether a class certification was proper and subject to judi-
cial review.16   
In the wake of Bazzle, most state and federal courts have treated that 
decision as authority to enforce class action arbitration where the agreement 
is silent.17  The arbitrators must look to the law of the appropriate jurisdic-
tion in determining whether to certify a class.18  Immediately following 
Bazzle, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) issued new rules for 
class action arbitration patterned after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.19  Rule 3 of the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration al-
lows the arbitrator(s) to decide the threshold questions of class certification 
when an agreement is silent: “Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall deter-
mine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the con-
struction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause 
permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf or against a class (the ‘Clause 
Construction Award’).”20 
Rule 3 goes on to state that, upon this determination, the arbitrator will 
stay the proceedings for “at least 30 days to permit any party to move a 
court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Clause Construc-
tion Award.”21  The proceedings are then stayed pending the outcome of 
                                                                                                                           
 
12
 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 
13
 Id. at 450 (plurality opinion). 
 
14
 Id. (citing Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 351 (S.C. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 
444 (2003)). 
 
15
 Id. at 450-54. 
 
16
 Id. at 452-54. 
 
17
 See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007); In re 
Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2004). 
 
18
 Marino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 729 (S.D. Fla. 2007); In re Terazosin Hydroch-
loride, 220 F.R.D. 672 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 
 
19
 See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATION (2003), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936. 
 
20
 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATION R. 3 (2003), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936. 
 
21
 Id. 
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judicial review.22  After a determination that the arbitration agreement per-
mits a class award, Rule 4 of the AAA then allows the arbitrator to deter-
mine whether the criteria of class certification (similar to Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules) are met.23  Again, once class certification is made under Rule 
4 (the Class Determination Award), the proceedings are stayed for thirty 
days to allow the parties to seek judicial review.24   
The interlocutory judicial review established by the AAA rules may 
not, however, withstand judicial scrutiny.  In Hall Street Associates, LLC v. 
Mattel, Inc., the Court held that the standard of judicial review cannot be 
changed by an arbitration agreement.25  The FAA limits its judicial review 
to those grounds specifically set forth in §§ 10 and 11 of the Act.26  One 
state court has already held that there is no interlocutory appeal, under Tex-
as law, from a refusal to certify a class by an arbitrator because the AAA 
rules could not alter the statutory law of Texas.27   
The issue of class action arbitration when the agreement is silent may 
finally be decided on the merits.  In Stolt-Nielson SA v. Animalfeeds Inter-
national Corp., the Second Circuit held that the arbitration panel did not 
exhibit a “manifest disregard” of the law and did not exceed its authority in 
finding that class arbitration was permitted under an arbitration agreement 
that was silent on the issue.28  Oral argument was heard before the Supreme 
Court on December 9, 2009.29  It is unlikely that a decision will be reached 
before publication of this article. 
In the interim, after Bazzle, many contracts with arbitration clauses 
were drafted to specifically exclude class actions.30  Florida courts have 
closely examined the legality of the class action arbitration waivers, with 
mixed results.31     
                                                                                                                           
 
22
 Id. 
 
23
 Id. R. 4.  
 
24
 Id. R. 5(d).  
 
25
 Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).  
 
26
 Id. at 586-87 (“[T]he text compels a reading of the §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive.”). 
 
27
 O’Quinn, PC v. Wood, 244 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 
28
 Stolt-Nielson SA v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 
U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. June 15, 2009) (No. 08-1198). 
 
29
 Transcript of Oral Argument, Stolt-Nielson SA v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2793 
(2009) (No. 08-1198), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts.a 
spx. 
 
30
 See Caban v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 606 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2009).  
 
31
 See S.D.S. Autos, Inc.  v.  Chrzanowski, 976 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (class 
action waiver violated public policy because it did not allow claimants to bring class actions under 
Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”)); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 
570, 574 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (arbitration clause that barred class actions, limited claimants to 
actual damages and barred declaratory relief was procedurally and substantively unconscionable).  But 
see Sanders v.  Comcast, No. 3:07-cv-918-J-33HTS, 2008 WL 150479 (M.D.  Fla.  2008) (class action 
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In the wake of these somewhat conflicting opinions, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit was recently faced with the task of applying Florida law to determine 
whether an arbitration clause that prohibited class actions for a FDUTPA 
claim was unconscionable or void as against public policy.32  The Eleventh 
Circuit noted that Florida law required a “showing of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability,” but could not adequately determine whether 
courts are permitted to “evaluate both prongs simultaneously in a balancing 
exercise” or whether each prong is independent and must be evaluated sep-
arately, and if one prong is absent the inquiry stops.33  Ultimately, the Ele-
venth Circuit certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court to clarify the 
unconscionability test and to determine whether barring class actions vi-
olates FDUTPA.34  Until the Florida Supreme Court issues its ruling, the 
question of whether arbitration clauses prohibiting class actions are valid in 
Florida remains unsettled and the subject of much litigation. 
III.  POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO CLASS ACTION 
ARBITRATIONS FOR PLAINTIFFS 
Plaintiffs bringing consumer class actions routinely attempt to avoid or 
invalidate mandatory arbitration clauses due to the added expense of arbi-
tration and the potential bias of certain arbitral forums due to their ties to 
corporate defendants.35  Indeed, pending legislation (The Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2009), seeks to amend the FAA to prevent use of pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer, employment and franchise 
agreements.36   
If, however, invalidating the arbitration clause seems unlikely (and li-
tigating the arbitrability question is itself expensive), it may make sense to 
arbitrate the class action in the first instance.  The following are some ad-
vantages and potential pitfalls to doing so. 
                                                                                                                           
waiver was not unconscionable where the consumers received notice that all claims were subject to 
arbitration and did not exercise their right to opt out); Fonte v. AT & T Wireless Servs., 903 So. 2d 1019 
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (arbitration clause which barred class actions was not unconscionable and 
did not defeat the remedial purpose of FDUTPA). 
 
32
 Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 
33
 Id. at 1134. 
 
34
 Id. at 1143. 
 
35
 See Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Stuck in a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the Prob-
lems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075 (2009).  See 
generally David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 
(2009). 
 
36
 S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). 
150 FIU Law Review [5:145 
 
A.  Class Certification 
Arbitration has traditionally been more beneficial to the corporate de-
fendants, who typically draft the contracts.  Many agreements are consum-
er-adhesion contracts, where the consumer has little or no choice and is 
often not cognizant of the arbitration clause.  For an individual plaintiff 
those costs can be onerous, particularly when the plaintiff typically is an 
individual consumer in arbitration against a large corporation.  The prob-
lems of the substantial arbitrator fees have been ameliorated by the advent 
of class action arbitration.  The costs are less burdensome when spread 
among a class and the high costs can be outweighed by the reward of a 
more substantial and more expeditious recovery.37  In fact, the AAA’s Ami-
cus Curiae Brief, filed in the Stolt-Nielsen case currently before the United 
States Supreme Court, notes that 94% of the Clause Construction Awards 
have permitted arbitration to proceed on behalf of the class, either by deci-
sion of the arbitrators (70%) or by stipulations among the parties (24%).38  
The Amicus Brief further notes that of those cases that have proceeded 
beyond the Clause Construction award, 50% have resulted in granting class 
certification, with another 13% agreeing to class certification by stipulation 
among the parties, and 38% denied certification.39  Without knowing the 
percentage of class certification in the Federal District Courts, logic tells us 
that it is likely to be lower.  
B.  Discovery 
Due to the more expeditious nature of arbitration, discovery is more 
limited than in litigation.  It is yet unclear just how much class action arbi-
tration changes the nature of expedited discovery.  Rule 21 of the AAA 
Commercial Arbitration Rules governs the exchange of information be-
tween the parties in commercial arbitration under its auspices: at the arbitra-
tor’s discretion or at the request of the parties, the arbitrator directs docu-
ment production and identification of witnesses to be called.40  The parties 
must exchange copies of the exhibits they intend to produce at least 5 days 
                                                                                                                           
 
37
 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 835 (2008) (noting that class action arbitration “provides a possible 
means by which claimants can vindicate small claims that could not be brought economically on an 
individual basis in arbitration [or in a court]”).  See generally Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Man-
datory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001). 
 
38
 Brief of Am. Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 22, Stolt-
Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309. 
 
39
 Id. 
 
40
 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES R. 21 (2009), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R21. 
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before the hearing.41  The amount of discovery allowed is left to the discre-
tion of the arbitrator who must be mindful of the expedited nature of arbi-
tration.42  Other bodies of arbitration, including various international arbi-
tration bodies, limit discovery but leave such decisions to the arbitrator or 
arbitral panel.43  It is likely that where there is class arbitration, there will be 
more discovery than is allowed among individual parties, but still less than 
in litigation which may tend to lead to a quicker and less costly resolution.44   
C.  Evidence 
The admission of evidence is in the discretion of the arbitrator as are 
questions of relevance and materiality.  Written testimony may be taken 
under both AAA and international arbitration rules.45  Again, since arbitrator 
discretion is generally the standard, it is difficult to assess, as yet, if class 
arbitration has greatly expanded the evidentiary proceedings.  However, due 
process concerns for the class members make it seem likely that some ex-
pansion is inevitable.   
D.  Settlement 
The AAA’s brief filed in Stolt-Nielson appears to indicate a greater li-
kelihood of class certification in arbitration than in class action litigation.46  
Once class certification is granted, corporate defendants have a greater in-
centive to enter into serious settlement negotiations.  While class action 
arbitration may not be the expeditious procedure contemplated when arbi-
tration law was developed, a faster resolution than in litigation may still be 
likely.47  In the AAA’s Amicus Brief, the statistics for the median time frame 
for filing to settlement, withdrawal, or dismissal of the 162 closed class 
arbitration cases that had come before it was 583 days.48  Although that time 
                                                                                                                           
 
41
 Id. R. 21(b). 
 
42
 See id. R. 21(a), R. 21(c). 
 
43
 See, e.g., ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION, RULES OF ARBITRATION, ART. 20, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/; see also LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, 
ARBITRATION RULE 22, http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/. 
 
44
 See Frederick T. Davis et al., Current Trends in US and International Arbitration, GAR ARB. 
REV. AMS. (2008), available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/4/sections/7/chapters/51 
current-trends-us-international-arbitration/. 
 
45
 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, OPTIONAL RULE FOR EMERGENCY MEASURES OF PROTECTION O-3 
(2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#O3; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROCEDURES Art. 17(1) (2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994. 
 
46
 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
 
47
 Brief of Am. Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 38, at 
24. 
 
48
 Id. 
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frame is not rapid by many standards, it is certainly more expeditious than 
most complex class action litigation, which takes many years to resolve.  
In addition, although the Federal Rules encourage courts to decide the 
question of certification early in the litigation, there is no way to require a 
court to rule on the motion for class certification.49  In some instances, the 
motion for class certification remains pending, while the parties are left to 
litigate the case in its entirety, including complying with pretrial orders and 
deadlines.50  Arbitral forums, such as the AAA, that put the certification 
question up front and provide the parties with greater control over the tim-
ing of the arbitrator’s decisions, may facilitate an earlier decision on the 
class issue, thus making settlement possible before extensive litigation costs 
are incurred.51   
E.  Judicial Review   
The FAA’s presumption in favor of arbitration and strict standards of 
review severely limit judicial review of an arbitral decision.52  The Florida 
Arbitration Code follows suit.53  The Supreme Court and the Federal appel-
late courts have not yet ruled on the validity of the interlocutory appeals 
from class certification that are set forth in the rules of the AAA.  Given the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hall, it is not at all certain whether the AAA’s 
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration will withstand judicial scrutiny.54  
While an unfavorable class certification opinion will be more difficult to 
appeal, the greater likelihood of granting class certification in arbitration 
would mitigate in favor of arbitration for plaintiffs.  
IV.  AVAILABLE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL FORUMS 
The flexibility of arbitration as opposed to litigation can be well suited 
to international dispute resolution.  Since arbitration is a matter of contract, 
the parties can determine the place of arbitration, language, procedures, and 
                                                                                                                           
 
49
 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
 
50
 Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(A) provides that the Court must decide a 
motion for class certification as early as possible in the litigation, there is no real enforcement mechan-
ism for this mandate.  In the meantime, the pretrial deadlines established pursuant to Rule 16(b) still 
apply, requiring the parties to complete discovery and file dispositive motions.  Of course, such pretrial 
discovery can be burdensome.  See Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Higgins, 975 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Prado-Steiman ex. rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 
51
 See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATION (2003), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936. 
 
52
 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 25-27. 
 
53
 FLA. STAT. § 602.01-22 (2009). 
 
54
 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
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applicable laws.  Of importance to the international parties is the ability to 
choose independent arbitrators as opposed to submitting to the opposing 
party’s jurisdiction.55  The parties can also select arbitrators who possess the 
technical competence to resolve their disputes.56 
Of the many international arbitration bodies, the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC) is one of the largest and most actively involved in 
the process.57  It consists of two supervisory bodies to administer its rules.58 
The International Court of Arbitration, made up of representatives of the 
ICC member countries, enforces the ICC rules and makes decisions of ap-
plication of laws and forums if not covered by the agreement between the 
parties.59  The tribunals draw up a document called Terms of Reference, 
which summarizes the rules, parties, place, and may also include the issues 
prior to the arbitration hearings.60  The Secretariat of the ICC consists of 
teams of counsel from various nations, communicates the awards to the 
parties, after scrutiny by the International Court of Arbitration, and provides 
additional supervisory functions pursuant to their rules.61  This scrutiny, 
prior to the issuance of the arbitration award, is unusual and provides an 
additional safeguard for the arbitration awards, which are generally not 
subject to appeal.62   
The AAA’s International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) is also 
a large body administered under its International Arbitration Rules.63  The 
ICDR does not play as large of a supervisory role as the ICC does, but the 
administrators will select arbitrators when the parties cannot agree and set 
the arbitrator’s fees.64 
                                                                                                                           
 
55
 See, e.g., ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION, RULES OF ARBITRATION, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, INT’L DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994. 
 
56
 See, e.g., ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION, RULES OF ARBITRATION, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, INT’L DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994.  
 
57
 See ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION, RULES OF ARBITRATION, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/. 
 
58
 ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION: INTRODUCTION TO ARBITRATION, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4089/index.html. 
 
59
 Id. 
 
60
 Id 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 Id. 
 
63
 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N: INT’L CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, http://www.adr.org/icdr. 
 
64
 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (2009), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Although class action arbitration may have tipped the balance to in-
crease the success of the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s attorney must be mindful 
that the law is still developing and may change in the near future.  In 2010, 
the Supreme Court will likely decide the merits of the arbitration agree-
ment’s silence on class action in Stolt-Nielsen.65  Given the recent history of 
the Court, predicting whether such a ruling will be favorable to the class 
action plaintiff, or even decided on the merits as opposed to procedurally, is 
difficult at best.  Certainly, as the law evolves, bringing class claims in arbi-
tration is an option that merits consideration. 
                                                                                                                           
 
65
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 
U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. June 15, 2009) (No. 08-1198). 
